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Abstract. This article examines the extent to which the rape shield is displaced by 
reliance at trial on the defence of honest or honest and reasonable belief in consent. It 
also raises the question of the legitimacy of judicial intervention in terms of denying 
the accused the opportunity to raise the defence of lack of mens rea. 
 
The controversy in England and Wales over the fate of section 41 of the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (the `rape shield’) has raged2 in the main in the 
absence of analysis of its relationship with the defence of belief in consent in sexual 
offence cases.
3
 Belief in consent is not an `issue of consent’ according to section 
42(1)(b), so the restriction on defence evidence or cross-examination about any sexual 
behaviour of the complainant, which is subject to the gateways in 41(3)(c), does not 
bite. This suggests that where mens rea is a contested issue and the complainant’s 
sexual past could have affected the defendant’s belief in consent, section 41 is 
powerless to prevent complainants from a humiliating inquiry. The effect of this may 
be to prompt an acquittal by undermining the stereotype of the `real rape’.4 It has been 
argued that solution of the problem lies in the abolition of Morgan
5
 mens rea for rape 
and sexual assault cases.
6
 However, the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief 
remains an issue,
7
 leading to fears of an open `invitation to the jury to scrutinise the 
complainant’s behaviour to determine whether there was anything about it which 
could have induced a reasonable belief in consent.’8  
 2 
There are good reasons, however, to believe that this is not necessarily the 
case. In the House of Lords it has been said that in practice the incidence of cases 
where there is a real issue of honest belief may be fewer than feared.
9
  In recent cases, 
courts have avoided this consequence through a variety of strategies, most notably in 
W,
10
 where, although counsel attempted to raise the defence of belief in consent, the 
Court of Appeal declared that it was not an issue in the trial. There are signs that 
courts in England and Wales (and, possibly, Scotland
11
) may be embarking on a path 
that is much more adventurous than is generally realised. The current debate on 
reform of section 41 must take account of the logical consequences of the approach in 
A (No2) and W; the crucial role of trial judges in relation to mens rea has not been 
fully appreciated to date. This key element of the verdict may be entirely removed 
from consideration by the jury with the incidental effect that to deny mens rea will not 
provide a means of circumventing the rape shield. This enhanced role of the trial 
judge raises questions of the legitimacy of refusing accused persons the opportunity to 
raise a defence, and of the nature of the prosecution’s burden of proof. 
 
Mens Rea as an Issue 
 
On one view, whenever consent is an issue in a sexual case, it is accompanied by that 
of belief in consent. A defendant is unlikely to allege that the complainant consented 
to intercourse whilst conceding that he thought she did not.
12
 The prosecution must 
prove all elements of the offence, so that to describe denial of mens rea as a defence at 
all is misleading. In Morgan, Lord Hailsham said: 
Once one has accepted…that the prohibited act in rape is non-consensual 
sexual intercourse, and that the guilty state of mind is an intention to commit 
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it, it seems to me to follow as a matter of inexorable logic that there is no room 
either for a `defence’ of honest belief or mistake, or of a defence of honest and 
reasonable belief or mistake. Either the prosecution proves that the accused 
had the required intent, or it does not.
13
  
In this particular case, however, there was no practical difficulty. Given that the 
defendants accused the victim of lying about her attempts to resist them, claiming that 
she had co-operated in the proceedings with `some relish’,14 there were two 
diametrically opposed accounts of events, and the jury simply had to decide which to 
believe.  
In the same vein, Lord Steyn suggested in A (No 2) that the defence of belief 
in consent would in many trials have no air of reality and would in practice not be 
available.
15
 For instance, a complainant might allege the use of violence whereas it is 
flatly denied by the defence, who allege that she co-operated. The conflicting versions 
exclude any claim to honest (and reasonable) belief. Lord Steyn’s analysis does not 
absolve the prosecution of its obligation to prove mens rea. The defendant’s 
reasonable belief in consent, with the issue of consent itself, stands or falls with the 
plausibility of his version of events. A story that the complainant was a willing 
participant bases the claim to belief in consent, not on the complainant’s sexual 
history, but on her alleged conduct.
16
 This may be seen in W,
17
 where an accusation of 
rape was made against the brother-in–law of a complainant who had been blind from 
birth and depended upon relatives for her care. W was accused of committing various 
sexual offences against her, including rape by way of inserting a foreign object into 
her anus. He claimed that she had consented, and that she had told him about various 
relationships with men in the past. The trial judge refused defence counsel leave to 
cross-examine the complainant about this on the question of the defendant’s belief in 
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consent. The Court of Appeal agreed both that the proposed questions were about the 
complainant’s sexual behaviour and that the refusal was justified; the clear conflict of 
testimony meant that there was only one issue in the case, which was consent. 
Maurice Kay LJ declared: `The primary issue before the jury was therefore a stark 
one. Honest but mistaken belief was at best a secondary issue’. The trial judge, of 
course, had to make his decision before hearing the defence evidence. The content of 
the defendant’s testimony, however, was probably immaterial. It is likely that the 
judge considered that the defence could be based only on one of the following 
propositions: first, the complainant consented and made it clear that she was content 
to be penetrated anally by solid objects, in which case sexual history of a conventional 
nature was irrelevant; alternatively, she expressed no view at all on the matter, in 
which case it is inconceivable that the defendant, on the basis of her previous sexual 
relationships, decided that she consented to this.  
In the absence of a clear set of principles, it is difficult to reconcile W with the 
earlier case of Barton,
18
 where the Court of Appeal considered that the defence of 
consent could be run simultaneously with what O’Connor LJ described as `genuine 
but mistaken belief’ in consent. It is not clear why both defences arose in that case.  
According to the complainant, the accused arrived at her flat at about 2.00 am, while 
she was in bed. He banged on the door, so she got up and shouted to him to go away. 
He broke the door open, pulled her to the floor and raped her. His account was that 
she had invited him to her flat and was a willing participant.
19
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Air of Reality 
 
Lord Steyn’s phrase, `air of reality’, is derived from a line of cases in the 
Canadian Supreme Court. Here the defences of consent and belief in consent are 
clearly separated, so that reliance on the former does not necessarily presuppose a 
claim to the latter, and may preclude it. The approach is that the defence of (in this 
context, honest but not necessarily reasonable) belief is, in every case, the defence of 
mistaken belief in consent; in most cases, a defendant who denies mens rea is taken to 
concede that the complainant did not consent. Thus, in Pappajohn v The Queen,
20
 the 
accused was charged with raping a female estate agent who visited the house he 
proposed to sell. She alleged that he had violently overcome her struggles, ignored her 
pleading, stripped her, tied her up and raped her. The accused claimed that she had 
been willing throughout. The Supreme Court held that there was only one issue in the 
case, which was whether or not the complainant had consented to sex. The trial judge 
was right not to put the defence of belief in consent to the jury; logically, a claim to 
have a mistaken belief cannot sit with a defence of consent.
21
 The two defences can 
co-exist only if there is evidence of something that could have led the accused to 
conclude that the complainant consented even though she did not. Where the two 
parties give diametrically opposed versions of the event, there is no such evidence.  
The requirement then, in the Canadian cases, is that there must be evidence of 
equivocal conduct from the complainant – something which could have caused the 
accused to make the mistake. In Esau,
22
 McLachlin J explained that consent as a 
defence is generally incompatible with denial of mens rea, given `the fact that human 
beings have the capacity to understand each other on matters such as these…the two 
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propositions require a third element of proof – evidence explaining how it could be 
that the complainant’s non-consent could honestly be read by the accused as 
consent’.23 The Californian Supreme Court has taken a similar approach. In The 
People v Williams,
24
 the defence argued that denial of mens rea (honest and 
reasonable belief) does not presuppose a mistaken belief, that is, does not 
automatically concede the consent issue. The court held, however, that a defendant 
may not plead both defences `absent substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that 
would have led a defendant reasonably and in good faith to believe consent existed 
where it did not.’25 Between them, the parties gave wholly divergent accounts, with 
Williams’ testimony suggesting actual consent. If believed, it would preclude any 
reasonable mistaken belief in consent.  
It is not clear whether the House of Lords in A (No 2) similarly embrace an 
equivocal conduct requirement, nor how far in this direction Scots courts wish to 
travel. In Doris v HM Advocate
26
 it was held that whether or not a judicial instruction 
on honest mistake is required depends on the circumstances. The Scottish Law 
Commission declared recently that a Morgan defence cannot be run unless the 
defendant accepts that the victim did not consent.
27
 The equivocality requirement has 
been criticised on the ground that cases of alleged sexual assault are portrayed as 
disputes in which the testimony of one party must be taken to be entirely true while 
that of the other is entirely false.
28
 Nobles and Schiff have suggested that it is quite 
possible that in these cases neither party will tell the absolute truth; perhaps there is 
no absolute truth. Effectively there are two sets of constructed truth, the differences 
between them reflecting the differences between individual interpretations of the same 
events.
 29
 Cavallaro
30
 argues that jurors should be entitled to find any middle ground 
between two conflicting accounts if they choose. Her example is the Californian case, 
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Mayberry.
31
 The complainant testified that she accompanied the accused, a stranger, 
to a shop to buy cigarettes, although he had threatened her with violence and 
demanded sex. The parties walked to his apartment where the alleged rape took place. 
The jury might have disbelieved the complainants’ account of Mayberry’s violence, 
whilst at the same time believing that nevertheless she did not consent. If so, 
Cavallaro argues, there was a valid defence of reasonable mistake. However, the 
equivocality approach does not in fact rule out a middle ground between the two 
conflicting versions of events. In Esau,
32
 Lieberman J explained that if there is a 
straight conflict of testimony between the complainant and the accused, the court 
should consider whether the jury can splice together some of each party’s evidence 
and settle upon a reasonably coherent set of facts capable of supporting a defence of 
belief in consent. This will not be an easy task. It should be noted, also, that even on 
Cavallaro’s analysis, Mayberry may have had no evidence on which to found 
mistaken belief. The trial judge would have to decide whether the complainant 
voluntarily accompanying the accused to his apartment could have led him to believe 
that she was willing to engage in sexual intercourse with him; the subjective nature of 
the equivocality judgment is discussed below.  
`To many lawyers it may seem curious to find that the more evidence of 
consent the defendant in a sexual assault case has, the less he can raise the defence of 
belief in consent. Instinctively they may consider an accused entitled to ask the trier 
of fact to find that the complainant did consent, while simultaneously suggesting that 
even if she did not he nevertheless proceeded in the mistaken belief that she was 
willing.
33
 However, we have seen a similar evidential burden imposed, in relation to 
the issue of belief in consent, on defendants who engage in sexual intercourse without 
informing their partner of a known risk of infection with the HIV virus.
34
 And in a  
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conventional rape case, the evidence which supports consent is likely to be the very 
evidence upon which the claim to belief in consent is based. If the jury reject it on the 
one issue, they will reject it on the other. A separate defence of mistaken belief is 
therefore necessary only where it rests on different evidence from that which suggests 
actual consent.
 
The equivocality doctrine therefore does not remove from the 
prosecution the obligation to prove mens rea. It is true that, as Cavallaro points out, 
there is no stated equivocal conduct requirement in trials of other offences, such as 
bigamy and assault, where the defendant denies actus reus and mens rea 
simultaneously. In relation to bigamy, however, the issue of equivocality does not 
arise. The dispute is likely to be about the validity of a divorce proceeding and/or its 
effect on his belief, rather than any equivocality in someone else’s behaviour. In self-
defence cases, the defendant is indeed entitled to argue in the first place that the 
victim was about to attack him (which the court may accept or reject) and also that he 
believed that he was about to be attacked. There could be two wholly divergent 
accounts of what the victim was doing. But here there may well be effectively an 
evidential requirement that amounts to an equivocality test. There must be some 
evidence that the purported victim was behaving in a manner that could be interpreted 
as aggression, whether or not he did actually intend violence. The evidence of 
violence in fact and the evidence suggesting that the defendant anticipated violence is 
likely to be the same. The jury can accept or reject it. In the absence of some evidence 
of threat from the alleged victim, the defence is effectively one of mistaken belief – 
there should be evidence which could have led the accused to believe he was about to 
be attacked, even though this was not the case.  
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Ideology and the Definition of Equivocal Conduct 
 
In sexual assault cases, unfortunately, the classification of actions by the 
complainant as equivocal or otherwise is unlikely to be a matter of universal 
agreement. It is a judgment that depends upon highly personal perceptions of the 
norm in sexual encounters. If the described behaviour is such that no reasonable 
person would consider it indicative of a willingness to engage in sex, it is not 
equivocal. This means that the defence of absence of mens rea may not be put, even in 
Canada, a jurisdiction in which the belief has only to be honest, and not necessarily 
reasonable. In Pappajohn
35
, it was not disputed that the parties had had an agreeable 
lunch together and had been drinking wine prior to the alleged rape. It was held that 
there was no evidence to support a mistaken belief in consent. Similarly, there was no 
equivocal conduct in Reddick,
36
 where a fifteen-year-old complainant had 
opportunities to escape a `continuing and developing situation’, but did not, and got 
into the defendant’s car to go to his apartment. It was held that the evidence was 
incapable of supporting honest belief. Instances of apparent equivocality are in fact 
quite short in supply. There seems a greater readiness to accept as a source of the 
alleged belief in consent some event external to the complainant, as in Morgan, 
where, had the defence been based on the husband telling his friends to disregard his 
wife’s resistance, there would have been an evidential basis for the defence of honest 
belief.
37
 Equivocality was a quality conferred externally also in a case
38
 where one 
man raped the complainant and then the defendant arrived and had sexual intercourse 
with her. He claimed that he had no idea that she had been threatened previously, and 
so assumed that her actions were not inspired by fear. Similarly, in Bulmer,
39
 there 
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was some evidence that the complainant, who may have been a prostitute, had 
consented to sex with Bulmer’s friend prior to the alleged rape by the accused and 
others, and had negotiated a price with the group of men. It was held that the 
defendant could have been mistaken as to her state of mind.  
Thus, whether or not the mistaken belief must be reasonable, the jury’s 
perception of reasonableness is neither here nor there. In The People v Williams
40
 the 
defence evidence that the complainant had consented was that she accompanied the 
defendant, much older than she and hardly known to her, to a hotel room, and did not 
object when he was handed a bedsheet by the hotel clerk (she said she thought they 
were going to watch television together). This was held to be insufficient evidence of 
equivocality. In the Court of Appeal Justice Low had argued that to hold otherwise 
would revive the `mistaken and repugnant idea that a woman loses her right to refuse 
sexual consent if she accompanies a man alone to a private place.’ The trial judge 
must assess the complainant’s conduct and decide whether it could have led a 
reasonable man in the defendant’s shoes to believe she wanted to have sex with him. 
Where he decides there was nothing on which such a belief could be founded, the 
jury’s opinion of the reasonableness of the accused’s belief will not be sought. 
It seems, therefore, that the question of the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
belief is more likely to be determined by trial judges’, not jurors’, perceptions of the 
meaning of behaviours in a sexual context. The significance of this is clearly 
illustrated in by the divergent views of Justices of the Canadian Supreme Court in 
Esau.
41
 The complainant was very drunk at the time of the alleged rape. The 
defendant claimed that she invited him into her bedroom. The majority of the judges 
refused to make an a priori determination that an honest but mistaken belief in consent 
is impossible when the complainant is intoxicated. McLachlin and L’Heureux-Dubé 
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JJ dissented, however, on the basis that if the complainant had been so drunk that 
afterwards she could not remember the event, the accused must have been at least 
wilfully blind on the matter of her consent. Espousing a communication model of 
sexual relations, they argued that a man is not entitled to take ambiguity as the 
equivalent of consent.
42
 In reply, Lieberman J, for the majority of the court stated;  
My colleague, Justice McLachlin, in her reasons in this case, narrows the 
defence to where it practically ceases to exist. [They]. .would expand the role 
of the trial judge and deny the jury the ability to apply its own wisdom to 
issues that arise in these cases by removing nearly all questions of fact from 
them.’43  
It is clear, however, that the equivocal conduct requirement does involve trial judges 
in making crucially important judgments of fact. These are not value-free.  
The importance of cultural context may be seen in an appeal in Scotland, a 
jurisdiction in which only recently has it been held that the use of force is not essential 
to the actus reus of rape.
44
 In McKearney v HM Advocate,
45
 the appellant broke into 
the house during the night when the complainer had gone to bed. It was undisputed 
that she awoke to find his hands round her throat. A prolonged and violent struggle 
ensued, during and after which he threatened to kill her. Overturning McKearney’s 
conviction, the High Court of Justiciary held that there was nevertheless evidence of 
her behaving in a manner that could have led to him forming an honest belief. This 
consisted of a `clear and long break’ in time between the violence and the intercourse. 
How long this lasted is unclear. During a discussion about access to their son, the 
appellant appeared to become calmer. He told the complainer to lie on her bed and lay 
down with her. He took no steps whatever to ascertain consent to intercourse. Lord 
McCluskey stressed that at that `second stage….there was evidence that the 
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complainer had, at the very least, not resisted the penetration; nor had she said or done 
anything to indicate that she was refusing intercourse.’ It is submitted that the trial 
judge was correct in his finding that the absence of physical resistance or actual 
violence at the precise moment of intercourse is not evidence on which to found belief 
in consent. We do not have to go as far as the decision in The People v Williams to 
hold that there was no evidence of equivocal conduct in McKearney.
46
  
 
 
The Evidential Basis of Equivocal Conduct 
 
In The People v Williams,
47
 it was said that the defence of honest and 
reasonable mistake must be put to the jury if there is some substantial evidence 
deserving of consideration, `not any evidence no matter how weak.’48 A bare assertion 
by the defendant that he thought the complainant consented is insufficient unless 
`supported to some degree by other evidence or circumstances arising in the case’.49 
Lieberman J concedes that in sexual assault cases testimony from each party is the 
most important source of evidence, but justifies the rule thus: `A belief that is totally 
unsupported is not an honestly held belief. A person who honestly believes something 
is a person who has looked at the circumstances and drawn an honest inference from 
them.’50 The contrary view is that an accused’s oath to the effect that he or she 
honestly believed in consent constitutes some evidence. However implausible it might 
be, its probative value is for the jury to decide.
51
 But such an argument overlooks the 
nature of the accused’s evidential burden in a criminal trial. The duty to adduce 
evidence is to provide evidence of the defence on which a reasonable jury could act, 
that is, evidence of  
 13 
 
sufficient substance to merit consideration by the jury…It is not every facile 
mouthing of some easy phrase of excuse that can amount to an explanation. It 
is for a judge to decide whether there is evidence fit to be left to a jury which 
could be the basis for some suggested verdict.
52
  
 
The defence, then, must adduce sufficient evidence, whether or not furnished 
by means of the defendant’s testimony, of the complainant’s equivocal conduct.53 The 
effect of cultural assumptions about sexual behaviour on this judgment also cannot be 
avoided. They can be seen to operate in decisions on sufficiency of evidence of the 
falsity of sexual complaints made by the complainant in the past.
54
 Most dramatically, 
their role was decisive in McKearney v HM Advocate.
55
 The appellant did not give 
evidence at the trial. On appeal, however, it was held that the evidence lay in the 
complainant’s description of her own conduct, that is, her failure to resist, and the fact 
that he had desisted from violence for a while; he may have convinced himself at this 
point that they had made up their quarrel.  
 The obligation on the defence to adduce sufficient evidence of equivocality 
does not undermine the presumption of innocence. The evidential burden to raise 
accident fell upon the accused in Woolmington
56
 simply because the prosecution had 
already discharged its own evidential burden on mens rea by dint of the substantial 
inference of intention arising from the accused pointing a gun at his wife and firing it. 
Some credible evidence of lack of intention was clearly required. In rape and sexual 
assault cases, similarly unambiguous prosecution evidence would cast an evidential 
burden on the accused to suggest a belief in consent. Thus the presumptions under 
section 75 Sexual Offences Act 2003, which in certain instances impose on the 
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defence an obligation to adduce sufficient evidence to raise the issue of reasonable 
belief in consent,
57
 are necessary only when the prosecution evidence of mens rea is 
not strong enough on its own to impose an evidential burden upon the accused.
58
 
 
Relevance of Sexual History to Belief in Consent 
 
Where mens rea is validly raised as an issue,
59
 `[t]he basis of the accused’s honest 
belief in the complainant’s consent may be sexual acts performed by the complainant 
at some other time or place.'
60
 The issue of relevance is highly contentious, however. 
Even a previous relationship with the defendant himself
61
 was seen to be of little 
significance by L’Heureux-Dubé J in Seaboyer and Gayne.62 The Canadian provisions 
under consideration
63
 allowed admission of proximate sexual history. Heureux-Dubé J 
concluded that these were sufficient to deal with any relevant sexual relations between 
the complainant and defendant; matters in the past had no bearing on the issues of 
either mens rea or consent. The majority of the Supreme Court disagreed with her on 
this.  
In the English case, Barton,
64
 the defence conceded that the complainant had 
been kicking the defendant and screaming during sexual intercourse, but argued that 
she had to his knowledge in the past similarly accompanied acts of consensual sexual 
activity with other men. O’Connor LJ directed trial judges to use common sense on 
the question of relevance: `There is a difference between believing a woman is 
consenting to intercourse and believing that a woman will consent if advances are 
made to her’.65 Otherwise, the cloak of belief may routinely be used to justify 
allegations of promiscuity. In contrast, in Doe v US
66
 it was held that the 
complainant’s alleged promiscuity, which the defendant had heard about from his 
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friends, was admissible to support his assertion that he reasonably but mistakenly 
believed the victim had consented. A counter-argument to this kind of reasoning is 
that a reasonable person should make their own inquiries rather than rely on gossip or 
bragging to found their own belief in another person’s consent.67  
 Barton suggests that a complainant’s sexual experience with others will rarely 
have a bearing on reasonable belief. Even where it has, there will seldom be any 
justification for demanding that the complainant provide more than the bare facts of 
the alleged promiscuity or relationship. Section 41(2)(b) stipulates that any question 
as to a complainant’s sexual behaviour must be justified on the ground that to refuse it 
would render a conviction unsafe.
68
 How much detail is appropriate to a particular 
line of defence is not always clear.
69
 In Davies
70
 a fourteen-year-old complainant was 
said by the defendant to have told him that she had slept with two men before. It was 
accepted that she could be cross-examined about this, in accordance with the decision 
in RT;RH
71
 that a complainant’s statements about her sexual behaviour fall outside 
section 41. The Court of Appeal also accepted the defence argument that the issue of 
whether or not the statement was true was important; if it were true, it was more likely 
that she had indeed told him this, and if so, that would be relevant to his belief in 
consent.
 
It was held, however, that the cross-examination should be limited to 
confirmation that she had slept with two men. Since even this level of detail is likely 
to have a serious effect on juror perceptions of the complainant’s credibility, it is 
reassuring to find the Court of Appeal more recently in W
72
 taking the view that 
RT;RH applies only to allegedly false complaints in the past. Cross-examination for 
other reasons on a complainant’s statement to the accused about sexual experience 
invokes section 41.  
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Conclusion 
 
It is submitted that the judgment in A (No2) has set courts in England and Wales 
some way along a road already travelled in North America. Although the judicial 
power to reject the mens rea defence in sexual cases may appear a robust one, it is not 
entirely unfamiliar. Judges routinely have to decide whether or not an evidential basis 
for a particular defence exists. If judges in sexual assault trials are to decide as a 
preliminary whether a complainant’s conduct can be regarded as sufficiently 
equivocal to support a defence denial of mens rea, the question of the reasonableness 
of a purported belief in consent will effectively be decided without jury involvement. 
The role of the trial judge is therefore crucial, and, perhaps, unenviable.
73
 Study of the 
North American experience shows how murky the waters become at the point where 
the complainant’s conduct, and whether a man could have interpreted it as indicative 
of assent to sexual intercourse, is judged. Here, perceptions can be highly personal, 
and potentially a source of unfairness. In Seaboyer and Gayne L’Heureux-Dubé J 
stated that an accused person does not have a right under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms  
whether under the rubric of a right to a fair trial or the right to make full 
answer and defence, to adduce evidence that prejudices or distorts the fact-
finding process at trial. As a corollary, neither do notions of a `fair trial’ or 
`full answer and defence’ recognise a right in the accused to adduce any 
evidence that may lead to an acquittal’74  
Fairness, therefore, does not justify evidence based on irrelevance, prejudice and 
stereotypes. On the issue of mens rea, it is for trial judges to decide whether that is the 
direction in which a proposed line of defence questioning will take the court. 
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